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THE STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
VERSUS STABILITY:
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND WESTERN
VALUES CLASH
ERINE. DOUGLAS *
Economic growth and human progress make their greatest strides
when people are secure and free to think, speak, worship, choose their
own way and reach for the stars.
President Ronald Reagan1
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of human rights lies at the center of past and present
political struggles throughout the world.2 The prevailing international
norms as established through international law set the standard of
what the world community constitutes as human rights. However, a
nation-state, as a sovereign unit, creates its definition of human rights
through cultural relativism, domestic laws and ultimately through the
relationship between the individuals within the nation-state and the
nation-state itself.3
With the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the
relationship of the individual and the state in China has been one of
hostility and betrayal between both the Chinese government and its
constituents.4 The CCP has been, and is fearful of, dissent within. The
Chinese people fear to question their government because of this hatred
of dissent. Adding to the hostility and betrayal is a western world torn
* J.D. candidate, May 2002, University of Denver, College of Law; B.A. May 1999,
University of New Hampshire.
1. JOHN FRANKLIN COPPER, HUMAN RIGHTS IN POST-MAO CHINA 1 (1985), for words
spoke by then President Reagan during a visit in April 1984 to Peking.
2. See RICHARD B. LILLICH & FRANK C. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 12-13 (1979)
3. ANN KENT, BETWEEN FREEDOM AND SUBSISTENCE CHINA AND HUMAN RIGHTS 5
(1993); See also Part I, C2 infra (Discussing Cultural Relativism as it distinctly applies to
human rights in China and inn particular, the Asian values debate).
4. See generally KENT, supra note 3.
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between the virtue of human rights for all and the vice of economic
power and might.5
This hypocrisy and conflicting passion suggest that until the
western world prioritizes whether to follow its virtue or vice, China's
human rights violations will not cease, but in fact, prosper. This paper
will not attempt to vilify either the virtue or vice, but will examine why,
in the past and present, human rights and economics in China is a
battle between the individual and state with western forces
intervening.
Part I of this paper will create a working definition of human
rights that includes an analysis of the universalist and cultural
relativist perspective and the Chinese definition of human rights. Part
II, will discuss what is of utmost concern to many in the international
arena; the CCP's silencing of the opposition.6 Through a historical
examination of various intellectual dissident movements, Part II will
show that the pro-active and successful stance of the Chinese
government in silencing the opposition and thus disregarding any
notions of human rights is a direct result of the CCP's perception that
the opposition poses a viable threat to stability.
Part III will address the problems of definition, priority,
jurisdiction and enforcement of human rights in China in the context of
both conventional and customary international law. Part IV will also
address the impact international trade and China's economy has had on
the western world's enforcement of human rights in China. Finally,
Part V will provide certain recommendations to the international legal
arena that will put China's predicament in an objective legal
perspective according to international law norms.
II. PART I: A WORKING DEFINITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Historical Overview of the Development of Human Rights
Traditionally, the international legal system was a law of nations.7
It was interested only with the rights and duties of states, not of
individuals.8 Therefore, the various domestic legal systems remained
5. See Alan St. Alexandroff, Concluding China's Accession to the WTO: The U.S.
Congress and Permanent Most Favored Nation Status for China, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L &
FOR. AFF. 23, 24 (1998) (discussing the US's conflict of trade with China and China's
human rights records).
6. See Consequences of MFN Renewal for China, Hearing before the Committee on
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 104 h Cong. 1 (1996) for a statement by Senator
Jesse Helms discussing the fears the U.S. has regarding the Chinese oppression of its
citizens [hereinafter Consequences of MFN Renewal for China].
7. Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 14 (1990).
8. Id.
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completely free to regulate the lives of their own citizens. 9
The American Revolution and the French Revolution of the late
eighteenth century, however, declared the first generation of human
rights. 10 They focused on individual, civil, and political rights that
attempted to guarantee both private liberty and democratic
participation." Both the American Declaration of Independence (1776)12
and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen
(1789)13 articulated natural or human rights.
4
The second generation arose with the Industrial Revolution of the
nineteenth century." The focus of the Industrial Revolution shifted to
social rights. 16 The Industrial Revolution created poverty and increased
the size of the working class. These changes demanded economic and
social rights to help overcome the adversities associated with the
17change .
The universalization of human rights developed during the
twentieth century. "s Post World War I Wilsonian idealism opined the
notion of people's rights and universalization with the creation of the
League of Nations.' 9 Article 22 of the League of Nations articulated
that peoples whose government failed as a consequence of war, would
be put under the protectorate of advanced nations as mandatories of the
League.20 These mandatories were to guarantee freedom of conscience
and religion and prohibition of such abuses as slave trade." Article 23
created an elaborate system for the protection of minorities." The
demise of the League of Nations did not lead, however, to the demise of
idealism."
9. LILLICH, supra note 2, at 54.
10. Winfried Brugger, The Image of the Person in the Human Rights Concept, 18
HUM. RTs. Q. 594, 597 (1996).
11. Id..
12. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776), available at
http://www.law.ou.edu/hist/decind.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2001).
13. FRENCH DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND OF THE CITIZEN (1789); See
also MICHAEL C. DAVIS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES LEGAL, PHILOSOPHICAL
AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 27, 30-34 (1995) (discussing further the French
Declaration)[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES].
14. See also LOUIS L. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 162-63 (contrasting the two
documents).
15. Brugger, supra note 10, at 597.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 597-98.
19. See generally LILLICH, supra note 2.
20. See id. at 2.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 3.
23. David Golove, From Versailles to San Francisco: The Revolutionary
Transformation of the War Powers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1491, 1495 (1999).
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Post-World War II, the establishment of the United Nations carried
on the idealism.2 ' The world, left with the consequences and aftermath
of the atrocities of war, needed some sort of order for the
future.25Through this desire, the United Nations set forth its Universal
Declaration of Human Rights [hereinafter The Declaration] .2
B. Human Rights as Defined by Western Values
1. Human Rights as Defined by International Treaties and
Covenants
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has been described as
"a transitional instrument somewhere between a legal and moral
ordering." 27 The Declaration contains thirty articles that proclaim
standards of achievements for all people and all nations regarding
human rights.28  This declaration established the foundation for a
universal human rights regime. Since, the promulgation of the
Declaration, the UN has drafted many international covenants that aim
to protect civil, political, cultural and economic rights. Amongst these
are: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights29 ; the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW)°; the Convention on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination 1; Convention Against Torture and other Cruel;
Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 2 and
Convention on the Rights of the Child.3
2. Western Definition of Human Rights
Many reason this desire to promote and protect human rights on a
universal standard as a Western value.34 From a Western viewpoint,
24. See generally supra note 23.
25. LILLICH, supra note 2, at 5.
26. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3' Sess.,
U.N. Doc A/810 (1948)[hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights].
27. KENT, supra note 3, at 7.
28. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 26.
29. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171[hereinafter ICCPR].
30. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
31. Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 195.
32. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 113 [hereinafter CAT].
33. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
34. WILLIAM THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN
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basic human rights have three correlative duties: to avoid depriving
(negative rights); to protect from deprivation; and to aid the deprived
(positive rights).35  With these three duties, human rights raise
questions about the essential values of society. 6 That is, the Western
World places emphasis on the individual whereby the societies of the
East value the community. Human rights also raise questions about
the relationship between the individual and the state. Based on a
particular government's definition of human rights, the treatment of
citizens within will differ.38 In addition, human rights raise questions
between international and domestic law. '9 Discrepancies arise between
state constitutions and international covenants." Moreover,
discrepancies arise between the actual practice and behavior of states
and the practice and behavior as defined through international
covenants41.
Western values state that human rights apply to individuals across
the board.42 They are not earned or based upon merit. Human rights,
consequently, are limitations on what a government might do to the
individual and what society is obligated to do for the individual. They
are the rights to be free from, but the rights to be free to, as well as the
right to be. The ability to be free, to have one's own thoughts, is the
most fundamental of all human rights.43 The freedom of thought, the
freedom of being free constitutes being human, being what and who one
is. It is, "being this particular person as opposed to someone else."4
This freedom is not possible in Communist China.
Further, from a Western viewpoint, author Stanley Cohen argues
that human rights information is communicated and targeted for three
audiences: (1) the official circuit of perpetration and observer
governments; (2) the mass media; and (3) direct appeals to the moral
public.3  When this information disseminates to the public, the
COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE 8 (1998)[hereinafter ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS].
35. See KENT, supra note 3, at 6-7 (discussing the three correlative duties in depth).
36. See Michael C. Davis, Human Rights in Asia: China and the Bangkok
Declaration, 2 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 215, 217 (1995)[hereinafter Human Rights in Asia].
37. This concept is discussed in greater detail infra in Part I, subsection C-2.
38. See Human Rights in Asia, supra note 36, at 220 (discussing that despite
constitutional mandates, the CCP permits little individual resistance or criticism).
39. KENT, supra note 3, at 5.
40. See Human Rights in Asia, supra note 36, at 220 (discussing Article 51 of the
Chinese Constitution).
41. Id. at 222-23 (illustrating that despite declaring adherence to international
human rights covenants, China continues to crack down hard on dissidents).
42. HENKIN, supra note 7, at 2.
43. CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 234 (William Theodore de Bary & Tu
Weimi:g eds., 1998)[hereinafter CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS] .
44. Id.
45. Stanley Cohen, Government Responses to Human Rights Reports: Claims,
Denials, and Counterclaims, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 517, 518 (1996).
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perpetrators that violate human rights standards deny responsibility as
part righteousness justification.46 Part of this justification rationalizes
that there are no universal human rights values and, hence, any society
can act according to its own morality.47 The other claim is that there
are alternative sets of values that, under certain circumstances, take
precedence over any universals.48  Confucianism is one of these
alternative sets of values that, historically, China has used to justify its
human rights practice.
C. Historical Overview of Human Rights in China
What are human rights? They are the rights of how many people, of a
majority, a minority, or of all the people? What the West calls human
rights and what we call human rights are two different things, with
different standards and points.
Deng Xiaoping 
49
1. Confuscian Impact
Society in China bases its thoughts and ideas upon Confucianism.
Confucianism, a major system of thought in China, developed from the
teachings of Confucius and his followers.5" Confucianism influences the
attitudes, pattern of living, standards of social value of the Chinese."'
Confucianism has served as the backbone of Chinese political theory
including that of human rights."
Confucianism details four analects that deal with human rights:
the paths of benevolence (ren dao); tolerance (shu dao); justice (yi dao);
and government (zheng dao).5 ' These Confucian thoughts articulate
ideas about human dignity.'
For instance, benevolence in Confucian theory is the maintenance
of personal dignity and a love of mankind. 5 Benevolence depends upon
the actions of individuals, not the collective whole.56 Tolerance is the
46. Cohen, supra note 45, at 530.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. KENT, supra note 3, at 51.
50. Microsoft Encarta: Confucianism, http://www.connect.nettron/confuscianism.html
(last visited Mar. 18, 2001).
51. Id.
52. See generally CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43, at 27-29.
53. HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 13, at 35.
54. Id. at 37.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 38.
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analect that includes the right of freedom of speech and academics. 7
Confucius mainly advocated in this freedom of speech the right to
criticize government and to be a dissident." Justice is the code of
political behavior in compliance with Confucian norms.59 It contains the
notion of ethics" and resistance. 61 The protection and achievement of
benevolence, tolerance and justice depends upon the object of the fourth
analect, the government. 2
Confucian tradition, however, stresses moral virtue to the state and
to its officials and lessens the worth of the individual.63 Communitarian
in outlook, Confucian moral and political thought advances:
The fact that the human person is essentially a social being; giving
primacy of place to the duties that persons have to the common good of
the community and the virtues needed for the fulfillment of these
duties and casting reciprocal social relationships and roles... as
fundamental to communal flourishing and its shared vision of the
good."A
Confucianism expects the individual to defer to the interests of the
collective, represented by the family, kinship or government.65
Historically, the fact the individual was bound to the "collectivity" ; the
family, clan or village, abridged the state's task of maintaining order.7
Everyone, as a collective entity, was responsible for the actions of one.6"
Therefore, Chinese culture is group-oriented and essentially hostile to
the individual. When the CCP came to power, it played upon the
Confucian notion of selflessness.69
a. Chinese Intellectuals and Their Definition of Human Rights.
Despite the "collectivity" argument stemming from Confucian
philosophy, intellectual movements in China have looked towards
Confucian guidance in entertaining their definition of human rights. As
mentioned above, the Confucian analect of tolerance advocated
57. HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 13, at 41.
58. Id. at 42.
59. Id. at 45.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 49.
62. See generally id.
63. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE IN CHINA 16 (Brian Hook, ed., 1996).
64. CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 43 at 40-41.
65. ASIAN VALUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 34 at 34.
66. The author refers to the "collectivity" throughout this paper. The CCP uses the
notion the "collectivity", based upon Confuscian norms, to argue for group over individual
rights. The "collectivity" stands for Chinese society as a whole.
67. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE IN CHINA, supra note 63 at 27.
68. Id.
69. See generally KENT, supra note 3, at 44-50 (discussing the CCP's rise to power).
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criticizing the government." All four analects, historically rooted in
Chinese culture and tradition, help legitimize the intellectuals' call for
human rights based upon the individual.
2. China's Definition of Human Rights
China argues that a nation's cultural and historical situation, its
guoquing, determines human rights.7' This is a central element of
China's claim for special treatment. 2 The CCP believes that the West
imposed values enshrined in international human rights declarations in
classic imperialist and colonialist fashion on other cultures. 3
The CCP believes that the "universal" values are not universal. 4
Values are, in the CCP's view, highly ethnocentric and alien to local
cultures and thus have no relevance to the internal affairs in China.'
Therefore, China argues those human rights conditions in
democratic and communist nations will differ.7 6 The CCP believes that
their political system and economic policy do not lend themselves to a
'Vestern" definition of the protection of human rights.7  For instance,
in responding to critics from the West, a Chinese newspaper, Renmin
Ribao (the People's Daily) reported that:
Our (China's) public ownership of the means of production and our
system of reward according to work, our system of the National
People's Congress, our socialist democracy and our socialist legal
system have given rise to a new form of safeguard for human rights in
their economic, political and legal aspects.8
a. Cultural Relativism: The Bangkok Declaration
China has denounced the universalist perspective on human rights
and instead argues for cultural relativism.9 Cultural relativism states
that universal standards of human rights do not override unique Asian
70. HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 13, at 42.
71. From Principle to Pragmatism: Can "Dialogue" Improve China's Human Rights
Situation? HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, 10 (1998)[hereinafter From Principles to
Pragmatism].
72. Id.
73. See Cohen, supra note 45, at 534. Cohen offers justifications for the rejection of
the universalist standard.
74. See Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human
Rights, U.N. Doc A/CONF. 157/Pc/59 (1993)[hereinafter Bangkok Declaration].
75. See Cohen supra note 45, at 530 for an account of government's denials to the
universal values.
76. See Bangkok Declaration, supra note 74, for China's position on human rights.
77. See Bangkok Declaration, supra note 74.
78. COPPER, supra note 1, at 5.
79. See Bangkok Declaration, supra note 74.
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regional and cultural values and the requirements of economic
development and the privileges of sovereignty. 80  The Bangkok
Declaration of 1993 tested in the international arena this particularly
Asian view of emphasizing stability and power over human rights and
demands for political reforms."'
The Bangkok Declaration summed up China's stance on human
rights." Asian nations issued the Bangkok Declaration in the Asian
preparatory meeting to the United Nations Convention on Human
Rights in Vienna in 1993.83 The Convention rejected the Bangkok
Declaration at the conference." The Bangkok Declaration was a symbol
of China's, and other Asian states', resistance to the imposition of
Western human rights values in Asia.
The Bangkok Declaration, unlike the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, put on paper, what, in fact, China was practicing. The
Declaration argued for the consideration of Asian historical, cultural
and economic factors (in essence cultural relativism) when determining
human rights standards.8 5
It states that the Asian region recognizes, "that while human rights
are universal in nature, they must be considered in the context of a
dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in
mind the significance of national and regional particularities and
various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds."" This included
national sovereignty over what constitutes human rights and human
rights abuses.87 It did not include a universal definition as advocated by
the UN.
8
Despite the rejection by the 1993 United Nations Convention on
Human Rights, China's White Paper on Human Rights still ascribes to
the spirit of the Bangkok Declaration.88 The White Paper states that a
country must have sovereignty to rule itself without outside
interference and be able to meet the subsistence needs of its people
80. See generally Daniel Bell, The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights: Reflection
on an East West Dialogue, 18 HUM. RTs. Q. 641 (1996).
81. Bangkok Declaration, supra note 74. See also Human Rights in Asia, supra note
36, at 216.
82. Bangkok Declaration, supra, note 74.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Human Rights in Asia, supra note 36, at 216.
86. Bangkok Declaration, supra note 74, at art. 8.
87. Id.; See also HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 13, at 17 (quoting
Head of the Chinese delegation Liu Huaquiu that state sovereignty is the basis of the
realization of citizens' human rights).
88. Bangkok Declaration, supra note 74, at art. 8.
89. See Guo Luoji, A Human Rights Critique of the Chinese Legal System, 9 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 1, 4 (1996).
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before it can aspire to other human rights achievements."
In the CCP's view, human rights should promote economic
development and collective rights over individual rights." The CCP
equates this economic development in China with stability and order.'
The CCP derives stability and order, collectively, from a uniform
consensus amongst its people. What the intellectual movements in
China have constituted as human rights is in direct conflict with these
views.9'
III. PART II: THE CCP SILENCES OPPOSITION
A. Overview of Human Rights Violations of Intellectuals in China
Asian societies, based upon their Confucian tradition, grant
intellectuals an exceeding amount of legitimacy. 9 This is due to their
belonging to a distinct institution of political critique in Chinese
history.9 The intellectuals, in their efforts to reform, have represented,
and suffered, for the masses of China.'
At the beginning of the CCP's rise to power, the intellectuals
believed it was their duty to participate in the government as officials
or advisors to high officials.9 " In the intellectuals' opinions, they were
the moral conscience of society.9 8 They felt it was their responsibility to
speak out against the abuse of official power and unfair treatment of
the population."
The intellectuals were, in their ambitious view, intermediaries
between the rulers and the ruled.'00 They attempted this bridge by
being neither part of the working class nor revolutionaries."' The
intellectuals were to merge with the new socialist order.'
2
Intellectuals have attempted to find ways of incorporating into
90. HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 13, at 35.
91. See generally, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE IN CHINA, supra note 63, at 204-05
(discussing the social changes brought about by economic reform).
92. Id.
93. Intellectuals, conversely, feel that improved human rights will ultimately give
way to economic development. Therefore, the CCP should focus first on human rights and
then development.
94. Bell, supra note 80, at 644.
95. KENT, supra note 3, at 137.
96. See id (discussing, for example, how intellectuals in imperial China were
punished, families injured, or killed for unsubstantiated charges against the government).
97. CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, note 13 at 262.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra, note 13 at 262.
101. THE INDIVIDUALAND THE STATE IN CHINA, supra note 63, at 151.
102. Id.
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their own view of China the things that they value in the West.03 The
intellectuals also look to Chinese tradition for answers to the problems
that they saw arising from the West's development. 04 The intellectuals
looked like the missing link to the modernity that was missing in
revolutionary China. However, the CCP would not let this be so.""5 The
CCP maintained the intellectuals so that their status was to work for
the state and to increase its power rather then allow them to bring
socialist energies and change.' 6
The intellectuals could build a bridge to development and at the
same time, their ideas were threatening to the communist regime and
the essence of communism itself.17 The CCP was weary of this potential
link because modernity was associated with western bourgeois
thinking.0 8 The CCP recognized the potential power possessed by the
intellectuals. 9 Yet, the CCP was in firm control of the state power and
an ideological hegemony was in place.' The CCP singled out
intellectuals as a threat to the CCP's stability."'
1. The 1954 Constitution
The CCP created the 1954 Constitution in an attempt to facilitate
economic reconstruction, and regularize and institutionalize the
political and legal structures in China."' While the Constitution
provided for many rights, the CCP created laws that, in effect,
circumvented the rights of the constitution if state interests or policies
were involved."' With the 1954 Constitution, the freedom of thought
essentially disappeared."' Article 51 of the Constitution stated, "the
exercise by citizens of the People's Republic of China of their freedoms
and rights may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society
and or the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other
citizens.""' The CCP, through Article 51, established its views of dissent
within the party. Article 51 thus limited the flexibility of intellectual's
103. CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 272.
104. See id at 261 (discussing the intellectuals' emphasis on Confucian values).
105. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE IN CHINA, supra note 63, at 152.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See KENT, supra note 3, at 149-50 (discussing the intellectuals attempts to
incorporate Western thinking and the CCP's response).
109. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE STATE IN CHINA, supra, note 63 at 152.
110. See id. at 151 (discussing the control of ideas and thoughts by the CCP, in
particular the control of intellectuals' viewpoints).
111. See id. (discussing, in particular, Mao Zedong's singling out of intellectuals).
112. KENT, supra note 3, at 54.
113. Id. at 55.
114. Id. at 54.
115. HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 13, at 108.
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within society. "'
2. Mao Zedong Cements His Power over China
It was during this time that Mao Zedong cemented his power over
China " 7 China, he believed, should embrace the ideas of class rights
and not human rights."' This encompassed the notion of rights held
collectively, not on the individual basis."9 Thus, under Mao's control
intellectuals were to uphold to the idea of the "collectivity". Mao
attempted to test their loyalty during his Hundred Flowers
Campaign."'
a. The Hundred Flowers Campaign
The pattern of the Hundred Flowers Campaign is a classic example
of the measures that explain the state and intellectual relationship in
China. The intellectuals posed a threat to the order of the CCP and the
government took a pro-active response to end this threat. The Hundred
Flowers Campaign was Mao's first major stand against the
intellectuals. 12
In response to an anti-Communist revolt in Hungary in 1956, the
Chinese government openly called for Chinese intellectuals to criticize
his government.' In a speech titled "On the Correct Handling of
Contradictions among the People" delivered on February 27, 1957, Mao
stated the best way to handle inconsistencies was by "letting a hundred
flowers bloom, a hundred schools contend." 3 Much to the dismay and
surprise of CCP officials, intellectuals came out in full force to express
their biting disapproval of the prevailing regime. 121
Mao launched a massive anti-rightist campaign. 5  The CCP
imprisoned these so-called counter-revolutionaries or sent them to
116. According to the parameters of Article 51, if any freedoms or rights interfered
with the goals of the state, than those rights may not be exercised. This applied to the
intellectuals right to thought.
117. See TANG TSoU, THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND POST-MAo REFORMS, 69 (1986)
(discussing Mao's coercive persuasion of manipulating man's motive for obeying political
power).
118. See KENT, supra note 3, at 54.
119. HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 13, at 87.
120. See id. (discussing the Hundred Flowers Campaign as actually a trap set by Mao).
121. See KENT, supra note 3, at 138
122. See THE CONTINUING CHALLENGE OF THE HUNGARIAN SITUATION TO THE RULE OF
LAW (Int'l Commission of Jurists, 1957) for a report from The Hague following the anti-
communist, anti-Soviet rebellion of 1957 in Hungary.
123. KENT, supra note 3, at 138.
124. Id. at 64.
125. HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 13, at 14.
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forced labor camps.'26 If sent to "reform" camps, the CCP forced
intellectuals to work seven days a week for up to twenty hours a day
hauling coal or collecting manure. 21  Thousands died of mistreatment
and malnourishment.
128
b. The Cultural Revolution
The same pattern of dissent by intellectuals, threat to the CCP's
stability and elimination of the threat apply to the counter-
revolutionary movements in China after the Hundred Flowers
Campaign. On May 16, 1966, nine years after the last major anti-
rightist campaign, the CCP formally launched the Cultural
Revolution. 9
The Cultural Revolution was to undermine the entrenched,
bureaucratic structures of the CCP and to reinvigorate the ideals of
mass participation.' Mao dismantled the judiciary and the CCP
closely examined and criticized citizens' backgrounds in public.1
3
'
Leading intellectuals were humiliated, tortured or even driven to
suicide. 132 Chinese authorities estimate that between 1966-1976, the
CCP persecuted 729,511 people and among whom 34,800 died.
33
The Cultural Revolution was Mao's greatest effort to eliminate all
dissent within the CCP and China and attempt to strengthen his party
as well." The Cultural Revolution was a dismal part of Chinese
history. It was a wholesale assault on tradition, family and person,
undermining any semblance of spiritual values, honor, dignity and
social status.'"
3. The Democracy Wall Movement
After the Cultural Revolution, the fall of Mao Zedong and the death
of his successor Lin Baio on September 13, 1971, Zhou Enlai came to
power. 136 Zhou's vice-premier, Deng Xiaoping established in January
126. KENT, supra note 3, at 64.
127. Id. at 65.
128. Id.
129. TSOU, supra note 117, at 341.
130. KENT, supra note 3, at 138.
131. Id. at 65.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 66.
134. See generally The People's Republic of China: The Cultural Revolution Decade,
1966-77 [hereinafter Cultural Revolution Decade] available at
http://www.chaos.umd.edu/history/pres.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2001).
135. See generally id. (discussing the various groups targeted under the Militant Phase
of the Cultural Revolution).
136. TSOU, supra note 117, at 341.
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1975 the Four Modernizations Program (agriculture, national defense,
science and technology and industry), in an attempt to change the
economic and technology sectors of China.3 7  However, in the
Democracy Wall Movement of 1978-79, intellectuals began to raise such
themes as the need for civil and political rights to match the economic
reform in China.
The Democracy Wall Movement attempted to establish a system of
socialist democracy that would reflect Marxist principles and eliminate
the unearned privileges of the political elite.1 38  It called for the
establishment of a legal system and the restructuring of government to
institutionalize these principles. 19 The Democracy Wall Movement is
important as it represents the moment when Chinese leaders could
have moved towards genuine political reform within the existing
socialist system, but did not.4 0 Instead, the CCP feared the change
these potential reforms might bring.1 4 ' Deng made it illegal to call for
freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association in ways implying
that counter-revolutionaries would enjoy them.14 ' These restrictions
helped fuel the passion and resentment of the masses. 1
4. The International Arena Becomes Aware
The international arena, largely, was unaware of the egregious
human rights abuses committed by the CCP. However, in the late
1970's, the revelations about the Cultural Revolution, the gradual
opening up of Chinese society through trade and joint business
ventures, and thousands of students' exits to foreign universities,
served to uncover the situation and internationally professed
ignorance. For instance, in 1978, the Carter administration issued a
first public statement on human rights made by a Western
government. "' The same year, Amnesty International issued the first
of many reports on China, entitled, Political Imprisonment in the
People's Republic of China. 6 Two years later, in 1980, Congress
published the first Congressional Report on human rights abuse. 7
137. See Cultural Revolution Decade, supra note 134.
138. KENT, supra note 3, at 140.
139. See id. at 142.
140. Id. at 146.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 147.
144. Id. at 154.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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5. The Tiananmen Incident
Students of revolution have long noted that trouble comes not from the
depths of misery but from the appetite that grows with better eating.
David Landes1
41
The 1989 Democracy Movement opened the eyes and minds of
people worldwide to the cruelty occurring in China. 9 Student leaders
called upon the CCP to: have elections to chose leaders; have an
independent judiciary; an effective legal system; and supervision of the
government through the press.5 Students demonstrated in Tiananmen
Square to protest against the CCP.'51
The tragedy and the results of the so-called "CNN-effect" forever
etched the events in history."' The student protests at Tiananmen
Square and the ensuing crackdown on dissidents called worldwide
attention to the gravity of the human rights abuses in China.
B. The Present Situation in China
Over ten years have passed since Tiananmen Square. Abuses and
violations of human rights in China still run rampant. These abuses
include: arbitrary detention; political imprisonment; torture and ill
treatment of detainees; deprivation of the rights to freedom of
expression and association; widespread failure to enforce laws
protecting the rights of workers and women; suppression of religious
freedom; and the use of psychological coercion in the implementation of
the population control policy."1
3
Recent reports claim that jailed members of the outlawed China
Democratic Party (CDP) face worsening prison conditions.'5' In
addition, the forced labor systems known as laogai are still present. All
of the recent constitutions of China even avow that the state maintains
public order and suppresses treasonable and other counter-
revolutionary activities. "' These constitutions penalize actions that
148. KENT, supra note 3, at 167.
149. Id. at 186-87.
150. Id. at 178.
151. Id.
152. See "The CNN Effect" TV & Foreign Policy, available at
http://www.cdi.org/adm/834/index.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2001) (discussing The CNN
effect as the impact live broadcasting of international events has on foreign policy).
153. HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA, supra note 13, at 2.
154. Health of Jailed Chinese Dissidents Deteriorating, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec.
5, 2000 [hereinafter Health of Jailed Chinese Dissidents Deteriorating].
155. See RAMIN PEJAN, REFORM THROUGH LABOR IN CHINA, reprinted at
www.wcl.american.eud/pub/humright/brief/v7i2/laogai.htm
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disrupt the socialist economy.156
The resistance within the Hundred Flowers Movement, Democracy
Wall Movement and the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989 were,
through their creation of disorder and dissent, threats to China's order.
If the Chinese government thought these to be harmless, they would
not have suppressed them. At the same time, the battle between the
CCP and the intellectuals in regards to human rights is not over. 157 One
can argue, however, that the CCP is winning.
The priorities of the CCP dictate the agenda of China. Intellectuals
and the rest of the world cannot convince the CCP that an idealized
platform of human rights will lead to economic development. Instead,
through the CCP's resistance to change, China has attempted to
preserve stability, thus ignoring human rights pleas.
15
According to Harvard economist and philosopher Amartya Sen, to
further dispute this position of the CCP, systematic cross-national
statistical studies do not confirm that there is a correlation between
authoritarianism and economic success.'59 Instead, affording population
civil and political rights may provide economic security through
appropriate government responses to societal problems.
60
As scholar Samuel P. Huntington so aptly argues, " economic
development is a continuous unstable process, which is a new policy for
the fulfillment of the people's demands. However, it usually further
enlarges their wants." 6' The social change brought about by economic
reform have led to insecurity and discontent among the more
disadvantaged and imperiled sections of China's population.6 2 These
have fueled social unrest and instability, accompanied by a widely
perceived decline in the standards of public order and morality. 16 With
many in China dissatisfied, and their government's refusal to alleviate
any tensions, the West has looked to lend intervention to the
situation.'" Non-governmental organizations, human rights watch
groups, international organizations, multinational companies doing
business in Asia, and major governments themselves are interested in
this attempted intervention due to the Chinese approach to human
rights. 65  This, in turn, has created jurisdiction and enforcement
156. COPPER, supra note 1, at 62.
157. See generally Health of Jailed Chinese Dissidents Deteriorating, supra note 154.
158. See KENT, supra note 3, at 194 and 235.
159. Bell, supra note 80, at 646.
160. Id.
161. HUMAN RIGHTS & CHINESE VALUES, supra note 13, at 136.
162. See id. at 131-32.
163. See KENT, supra note 3, at 193.
164. See HuMAN RIGHTS & CHINESE VALUES, supra note 13, at 116.
165. See generally http://www.amnesty.org; http://www.HRICHina.org; Lena Ayoub,
Nike Just Does It-And Why the United States Shouldn't: The United States' International
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problems in the realm of human rights.'6
IV. PART III: PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION, PRIORITY, JURISDICTION AND
ENFORCEMENT RIGHTS IN CHINA
A. Jurisdiction Problems
1. Jurisdiction
In the humanist, Western tradition, law protects human rights.
1 6 7
When the CCP came to power; they abolished previous legal codes and
institutions. 16 They originally introduced no civil and criminal legal
order.169  Instead, the CCP ruled in a manifestly arbitrary and
fundamentally lawless way."' On the contrary, international law
derives from the theory that an individual is, somewhat, a subject of
international law with enforceable rights, which do not derive their
validity from citizenship of a sovereign state .71
As Australian scholar Ann Kent argues, human rights are a lifebelt
between the individual community and the individual, which, by
implication, bypass the authority of the state. 17 Further, she contends
that to uphold the cultural relativism that China maintains is to say
that every culture is equally valid and that no external values should
contaminate it. 73 Thus, cultural relativism is an argument against the
international jurisdiction of human rights.
Though not normally tested, courts should be able to obtain this
international jurisdiction over human rights abuses through
international covenants and treaties. The UN Charter does not
specifically address or promote this international jurisdiction. In fact,
Article 2(7) of the UN Charter forbids the interference in matters that
are "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."74
However, it is my contention that gross violations of human rights
should rise from the area of domestic jurisdiction to the international
arena. As L. Henkin has observed:
Obligation To Hold MNC Accountable For Their Labor, 11 DEPAUL BUS.L.J. 395 (1999);
Consequences of MFN Renewal for China, supra note 6.
166. See KENT, supra note 3, at 19.
167. COPPER, supra note 1, at 2.
168. Id. at 41; See also KENT supra note 3, at 54 (discussing the 1954 Constitution
which replaced the previous laws under non-Communist China).
169. KENT supra note 3, at 54.
170. COPPER, supra note 1, at 41.
171. LILLICH, supra note 2, at 55.
172. KENT, supra note 3, at 19.
173. Id. at 20.
174. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
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Such violations surely are not a matter of domestic jurisdiction.
Whether an alleged infringement is such a violation is a question of
international law, not one for an accused state to determine finally.
Furthermore, if human rights were always a matter of domestic
jurisdiction and never a proper subject of external attention in any
form, provisions of the UN charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the various international covenants and conventions and
countless activities, resolutions, and actions of the UN and other
international bodies would be ultra vires.
17 5
China argues that it is ultra vires1 6 or outside the scope of law, for
the international arena to prescribe subjective laws for China that are,
essentially non-existent. However, by signing various conventions,
covenants and treaties, China has consented, as a matter of law, to
international jurisdiction.177
2. Customary International Law
Customary international law is another basis for the international
jurisdiction of human rights abuses. Customary international law
crystallizes through three scenarios: 1) diplomatic relations between
states; 2) practice of international organs; and 3) state laws, decisions of
state courts, and state military or administrative practices. 78 The
diplomatic relations between most Western states has recognized
customary international jurisdiction over human rights abuses
violations. 7 9  It is in the opinion of most of these countries that the
universalization of human rights is customary international law, and
states should abide by it.' 80 China disagrees, and hence enforcement
problems of this international jurisdiction arise."'
B. Enforcement Problems
No independent enforcement agency exists to aid the new
transactional concern with the rights of the individual.8 ' Since no legal
agency enforces rights, their actual enforcement is ultimately
dependent on the political will of the state. China does not have the
political will, or agenda, to promote this enforcement. Therefore, the
175. HENKINS, supra note 7, at 56.
176. See BLACK'S LAW Dictionary 1525 (7h ed. 1999) as it defines ultra vires as,
"Unauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by
law."
177. Please refer to Part III Sub-Section B-2, infra, for a discussion of this
178. INTERNATIONAL LAW 135 (Barry Carter & Phillip Trimble eds., 3' ed. 1999).
179. Id. at 848.
180. Id.
181. See Bangkok Declaration, supra note 74.
182. KENT, supra note 3, at 22.
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question arises over how to enforce an international norm of human
rights.
1. Military Intervention
International humanitarian interventions such as those that
occurred in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia circumvented Article 2(7) of
the UN Charter. '83 In these extreme situations, nations attempted to
enforce human rights through military intervention.' Those in accord
with the intervention believed it was necessary.'85They also believed it
was within the enforcement mechanisms of international law."' Those
against felt these interventions unrightfully interfered with the
domestic jurisdiction of the countries "invaded."87
Thus, military intervention is, arguably, an enforcement
mechanism to promote a universal human rights standard. Yet, it is
doubtful that the international arena would impose such harsh
enforcement to China because of their preeminent world status.
Therefore, the international community must ponder if any
mechanisms exist to deter China from its current regime of human
rights abuses.
2. China as Signatory to many International Covenants
China is a signatory to many international covenants."' They
continue to sign international covenants on human rights such as the
U.N. Pact on Rights and Rule of Law.' Most Asian nations, including
China, signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However,
most signed it for pragmatic, practical purposes, not because of a deeply
held commitment to the human rights norms within the Declaration.'
The treaty, as a matter of international law, binds China.
183. INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 178, at 1167 (discussing the only lawful use of
force by a state is that under the article 51 self-defense exception. There is a suggested
exception, however, to Article 2(4) for benign purposes such as humanitarian
intervention).
184. Id. at 1178-79.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1169.
187. Id.
188. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 26; ICCPR,
supra note 29; CEDAW, supra note 30; CAT supra note 32; Convention on the Rights of
the Child, supra note 33.
189. Erick Eckholm, China Signs U.N. Pact on Rights and Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 21. 2000 atA4.
190. Bell, supra note 80, at 641.
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3. International Court of Justice
Those believing in the international norm of human rights can
perhaps look to the International Court of Justice as an agency to
enforce the Declaration. Article 38 of the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) details amongst others that:
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
a. international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states.
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law;
c. the general provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the
teaching of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of
law. 19
1
Decisions of the ICJ are binding between those party to the decision
and in respect of the particular case at hand.1 92 If China did not comply,
than under the provisions of the ICJ, the nation opposing China can
bring it to the UN for enforcement. 93
Courts may derive international law from custom. The practice of
states can develop into international law.'9 However, a principle of
customary international law is not binding on a state that declares its
dissent from the principle during its development.195 China argues
customary international law regarding human rights will not be
applicable to them, as from the beginning they opposed the universal
definition.1 96 However, China's contentions are moot as China is a
signatory to universal declarations.
The jurisdiction and enforcement problems regarding the human
rights situation in China is a precarious one. Without the political will
and consent of China, it is difficult to accomplish major change. Some
argue a means to force the end of human rights abuses in China is
through adversarial actions to communism and friendship to
191. I.C.J. CHARTER, Art. 38.
192. Id. at Art. 59.
193. U.N. CHARTER, Art. 94(1).
194. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 178, at 135.
195. Id. at 138.
196. See generally Bell, supra note 80.
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democracy; capitalism. 1
97
V. PART IV: IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CHINA'S ECONOMY
ON THE WESTERN WORLD'S ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA
A. The Role of Multinational Corporations
If the question were put now to everyone, everywhere-do you wish to
become a citizen of the world?-it is safe to assume that most people in
most places would answer, no, they wish to remain who they are.
William Greiderl"
Multinational corporations (MNCs) are a proponent of capitalism.
The role of MNCs in the area of human rights and development are
highly opinionated and controversial.' Those that are pro-MNCs state
that MNCs are the engines of development.2' This view holds that
MNCs operating in the developing world directly promote economic and
social rights, and indirectly support civil and political rights.2"' MNCs
are able to do this through promotion of development by creating jobs
and bringing in new capital and technology. °2' The United States
largely agrees. 3 The government has often proposed an open
environment for direct foreign investment by MNCs as a tool of
development to increase the living standards and promote democracy in
the developing world.' °
The changing nature of politics and the ever-increasing socio-
economic influence of large corporations, however, often make MNCs
more important than governments when it comes to the daily impact in
the developing world.0 5  MNCs have a massive economic impact on
developing nations. Many academians, politicians and financiers
believe that economic development through MNCs enhances human
rights conditions.' °
One example of this is the so-called "spillover effect" of MNCs
197. See Consequences of MFN Renewal for China, supra note 6, at 6, for a letter to
Senate on behalf of many in the California business community.
198. WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT 333 (1998).
199. See generally Ayoub, supra note 165.
200. See generally William H. Meyer, Human Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus
Quantitative Analysis, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 368 (1996).
201. Id. at 376.
202. Id..
203. Id.
204. Meyer, supra note 200, at 378.
205. Id. at 368, 370.
206. Id. at 368.
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development of China's coastal regions. °7 MNCs began to invest and
build along China's coast. 28 The MNCs underpaid the labor, but the
labor could not protest.209 As the enterprises became capital and
technology intensive, living standards and pay rose. The spillover effect
argues that this growth rate will move inland as foreign companies
search for cheaper labor.2"'
Moral claims and responsibilities are as legitimate concerning
MNCs as they are in regards to individuals and governments. Those
that are opposed to MNCs rapid expansion believe that MNCs lead to
the deterioration of human rights in the civil, political and socio-
economic spheres. 21 As global interdependence is reaching an all-time
high, as individual MNCs eclipse the income and power of many
developing nations, and as the international system is evolving, MNCs
move to the center stage in the international arena.1 2 Yet, there is no
real moral or legal accountability for the actions of corporations.212
The United States has repeatedly failed to recognize a legal duty to
enforce their MNCs to respect the international labor rights of foreign
workers exploited by subsidiaries. 4 The US is not a signatory to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights215 ,
CEDAW216 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.2 7
International workers are also exempt from the Fair Labor Standards
Act.218  The United States has continued to profit at the expense of
human rights violations that its nationals (MNCs) justify with profit
maximization.1 9 Consequently, the United States government has
virtually exempted itself from accountability for labor rights violations
of workers abroad.
The United States has a legal obligation under international law,
specifically its duty under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and customary law, to regulate and punish
American MNCs that engage in activities that violate foreign workers'
labor rights. 20  The United States should adopt legislation that
prohibits and punishes MNCs for engaging in labor practices that
207. Bell, supra note 80, at 644.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Meyer, supra note 200, at 377.
212. See id. at 373.
213. See generally Ayoub, supra note 165.
214. Id.
215. ICCPR, supra note 29.
216. CEDAW, supra note 30.
217. Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 33.
218. See generally http:/ www.elaws.dol.gov/flsa (last visited Jan. 20, 2001).
219. See Ayoub, supra note 165 at 399.
220. Id.
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violate international labor norms as recognized through the ICCPR and
customary law.
The US must regulate its MNCs abroad and cooperate with China
economically in order to aid the human rights situation there.22' The
US can achieve this cooperation in helping China gain entrance to the
World Trade Organization and grant permanent Most Favored Nation
status to them.
B. The Role of China's Most-Favored Nation Status with the United
States and World Trade Organization Accession
Passing permanent normal trade relations will open China's market to
us and will promote the cause of change in China
President Clinton, State of the Union Address, January 27,2000 .52
Most-Favored Nations (MFN) status is the standard of general
tariff treatment the United States extends to other countries in return
for reciprocal tariff treatment for US exports.23 The US has granted
China MFN status in the past, on a yearly reviewable basis. 2 14 It is
presently a heated debate whether the US should continue to do so. 225 It
is in the US' best interest for security and commercial reasons to
continue granting China MFN status.226  This will aid China in
becoming a full-fledged member of the international economic and
political community through the World Trade Organization (WTO). 227
China's population represents more than one/fifth of the world's
population and its economy is the third largest beyond the US and
Japan.228  China is pursuing a rapid modernization program that
sometime in the next century may make it the world's largest
economy.229China is the fourth largest trading partner of the US. In
221. See generally Meyer, supra, note 200 (proposing that economic development leads
to improving human rights conditions in developing nations).
222. See us.govinfo. about.comlnewissues/usgovinfo/library/ref/blsoufull.htm (last
visited Jan. 14, 2001).
223. See generally Consequences of MFN Renewal for China, supra note 6.
224. See WTO & Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China,
http://www.infoserv2.ita.doc.gov/ticwebsite/apweb.nsf (visited Mar. 8, 2001)[hereinafter
WTO & Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China].
225. Id.
226. See id. (discussing that if China is to join the WTO, a yearly reviewable basis of
China's MFN status would violate WTO rules as it would impose discriminatory
procedural requirements on China that are not imposed on other WTO members).
227. Consequences of MNF Renewal, supra note 6, at 4 (statement of Senator Bider).
228. Id. at 4.
229. Id.
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2000, China supplied the US with $94 million in imports." It also
purchased $15.1 million worth of US exports. 231
Many believe that China restricts access to its markets with some
of the world's highest tariffs, extorts knowledge and high skilled jobs as
the price of doing business there, and dumps artificially low-priced
products on American markets, hurting US competitors. 2 They say the
$78.9 million trade deficit with China is representative of this artificial
dumping."
Congress and the Senate, for years, have been troubled with US-
China relations. Sven Kraemer, former Director of Arms Control for
the National Security Council in a Senate hearing expressed the dismay
of many.2"4He stated:
The equal playing field of trade in China cannot be achieved
unlessyou have very significant democratic reforms and unless the
security situation is stable. You can make changes and can trade till
you are blue in the face, but if the playing field is not equal politically
and diplomatically, and honorable in the sense of treating your own
people fairly and treating foreigners and other countries fairly, which
means abiding by contracts and having checks and balances and a
sense of honor, then no amount of trade makes any difference.235
In recent years, exposure to international norms and legal systems
has played a role in the legal reform effort of China that is broadening
citizens' rights. 23" Reforms include: the 1997 amendments to the
Criminal Procedure Law which limit police detention of suspected
criminals; the 1989 Administrative Procedure Law which allows
citizens to sue government officials; and the 1994 State Compensation
Law which allows citizens who win such suits to collect damages.237
The most repressive periods in recent Chinese history occurred in
times of international isolation."s The Chinese people have an
increased semblance of openness, personal liberties and social liberties
due to exposure to the outside world. These include greater freedom of
movement, greater choice of employment, schooling, housing
230. See China's Country Commercial Guide, http://www.usaatrade.gov/website (last
visited Feb. 27, 2001)[hereinafter China's Country Commercial Guide].
231. Id.
232. Consequences of MFN Renewal for China, supra, note 6 at 3 (statement of Senator
Feingold).
233. See Appendix A for the US-China trade deficit.
234. Consequences of MFN Renewal for China, supra note 6, at 87
235. Id. at 87-88.
236. See HuMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 13, at 132 (discussing
improvements in human rights in China since 1992).
237. See httpY/www.chinapntr.gov, now available at www.mac.doc.gov/china.
238. See generally TSOU, supra note 117 (discussing the isolated Mao Zedong years and
the devastating effects of the cultural revolution).
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opportunities, and improved access to information.2
The accession of China to the World Trade Organization will help
promote reform, accountability, and openness in China. Voting to enact
permanent MFN status, alternatively called Permanent Normal Trade
Relations (PNTR) with China is the most significant immediate action
the US can take to move China in the right direction. The US and
China have negotiated a proposed WTO agreement and permanent
MFN status. 240 The US can benefit from this opportunity and enhance
its national interests from this accession. 4 ' It will also increase the
chance that China will open further to global forces that will empower
its people, increase access to information, expand their contact with the
democratic world, and deepen their connections to outside influence and
ideas .242
The accession agreement of China will deepen and help to lock in
market reforms. It will encourage the CCP's leaders in power to move
further and faster toward economic freedom. China can move into the
twenty-first century with greater technological freedom. In opening
China's telecommunications market, including access to Internet and
satellite services, the agreement will help expose the Chinese people to
information, ideas, and debate from around the world.243
The accession of China to the WTO will help strengthen the rule of
law there and increase the likelihood that it will play by global rules.44
Many human rights activists and members of the foreign policy
community agree that bringing China into the World Trade
Organization will help move China in the right direction. Martin Lee,
Chairman of the Democratic Party of Hong Kong is one of these people.
In a letter to President Clinton on November 14, 1999, he wrote:
The participation of China in the WTO would not only have economic
and political benefits, but would serve to bolster those in China who
understand that the country must embrace the rule of law, which of
course is a key principle underlying active membership in global trade
organizations... For those of us who have long pressed for vigorous
adherence to the rule of law in China, it is encouraging that so many
Chinese officials support the nation's entry into groups such as the
WTO.2 5
239. See HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 13, at 132
240. Robert Marquand, With Concerns of Unrest, China Puts Brakes on WTO, THE
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 16, 2001 at 7.
241. See WTO & Permanent Normal Trading Relations for China, supra, note 223 for
the International Trade Administration of the Department of Commerce's position on
Chinese WTO entrance.
242. http://chinapntr.gov, now available at www.mac.doc.gov/china.
243. Id.
244. See generally Alexandroff, supra note 5.
245. http://www.chinapntr.gov, now available at www.mac.doc.gov/china.
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The international economic community cannot encourage the
integration of China into the global economy with absolute ease. All
parties involved must take steps to help facilitate this transition. It
will not be an overnight process. China will not be in compliance within
the next month, year and perhaps decade. It is an evolving process.
For instance, on May 3, 2000, the US Commerce Department set up a
China Compliance and Enforcement Initiative involving a five-point
plan to ensure WTO compliance of China.246 With positive strides,
greater economic freedoms will lead to greater personal freedoms within
China.
VI. PART V: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARENA.
On a systemic level, there are overall flaws in policy that allow for
the development versus human rights continuum to perpetuate. These
flaws include the development theories that allow international trade
law to ignore the rights of the individual.2 4 ' They also include the lack
of a true enforcement mechanism on behalf of international human
rights law.4 As legal scholar Steve Charnovitz argues, "International
trade law needs to become more like international human rights law in
establishing norms for what a State owes its own citizens.
International human rights law needs to become more like
international trade law in enforcing norms through mandatory dispute
settlement and potential penalties for non-compliance. "n49
On a sub-systemic level, it is important to appreciate the different
value systems between the West and China. Awareness of the cultural
differences between the two allows for persuasive justifications for
human rights practices.2 0  However, an effective channel of
communication cannot merely be an empty discourse of hackneyed
speeches about "Western" versus "Chinese" values. Egregious
violations of human rights are not acceptable, regardless of a nation's
history, culture, and rate of economic growth or slight improvements in
human rights. They do not mitigate or excuse a government from
scrutiny of its practices.
The CCP, since its inception, has defied the notion of human rights
over the "collectivity". Neither cultural relativism, universalism, nor
Confucianism will truly bring about a shift in this viewpoint. That shift
246. http://www.chinapntr.gov, now available at www.mac.doc.gov/china.
247. Steve Charnovitz, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights at 50 and the
Challenge of Global Markets: The Globalization of Economic Human Rights, 25 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 113, 117 (1999).
248. Id. at 118.
249. Id.
250. Bell, supra note 80, at 647.
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will not occur solely through external pressure, but from pressure
within. The shift will occur through China's greatest asset, its people.
It is for this very reason that the CCP has proceeded with a course of
suppression. The Chinese economy will grow, its military may expand,
but the greatest potential and threat resides in its population. The
CCP's pro-active policies may have worked so far. It is the reactive
responses of China's masses, however, that will ultimately disrupt the
stability.
Therefore, a delicate maneuvering is required to maintain a
balance between reform and stability. Despite the motives behind both
Chinese and Western critics, it is those suffering the human rights
violations that must be kept in mind. Certainly, those tortured,
imprisoned and killed, and their families, should not accept culture as a
valid excuse for these human rights violations; nor should China.
In assessing post-Mao China from the various human rights
perspectives, the dilemmas arise between the requirements of
modernization and the demands of communist doctrine and structure.
The international community clearly risks damaging the credibility of
international institutions established for the purpose of dealing with
human rights abuses by allowing China to evade the scrutiny of the
those institutions established.
As a member of the UN, bound by its Charter and a party to
numerous human rights treaties, China voluntarily accepts the
responsibility to be accountable to the international community on
human rights. Now, it is up to these organizations to place some sort of
enforcement mechanisms within themselves to monitor and address the
situation in China.
China, also needs to not evade international scrutiny. China is
becoming a major player in the international economic arena.251
Countries like the United States recognize the importance of China as a
trading partner.25 These countries are willing to keep trade talks open
with China despite their human rights record. 53 China needs to
appreciate the dilemmas countries go through when deciding to
continue trading with them. China must not take for granted the help
the outside world gives. While China does not have to accept this
outside world, nor Western values, China cannot internalize and isolate
from the expanding world market. China needs to show some
flexibility, to its people and to the international community and show
that is, after decades of closed-mindedness, open for business.
251. See generally WTO & Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China supra note
224.
252. Id.
253. The US negotiation of MFN status is an example of this.
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This includes recognition of individual human rights and the protection
thereof.
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES' TRADE DEFICIT WITH THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) 1998-2000
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